Creating and sharing knowledge to help end poverty 
Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world's biggest promise -a global agreement to reduce poverty and human deprivation at historically unprecedented rates through collaborative action.
1 They differ from all other global promises for poverty reduction in their comprehensive nature and the systematic attempts taken to finance, implement and monitor them. While the MDGs have a comforting aura of global harmony and solidarity around them -'[t]hey envelop you in a cloud of soft words and good intentions and moral comfort' 2 -there have been and are heated arguments around them. The processes from which they emerged 3 -UN conferences and summits, meetings of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the Millennium Summit and UN General Assembly meetings -were scenes of overt and covert contestation. Different countries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements, faiths and leaders formed shifting coalitions to shape the goals according to their moral positions and political interests. What should be included in an authoritative list of global goals, and what should be excluded, taxed the analytical, bargaining and negotiating skills of tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands of technical specialists, social activists, policy makers and politicians around the turn of the millennium. BWPI Working Paper 100, BWPI, The University of Manchester. 4 In UN documents when a member 'square-brackets' text this means that, unless the text is modified or removed, the member concerned will formally register reservations. 5 The framing of the issue varies over time and between interest groups. Originally this was the problem of 'population and development'. Social activists reframed the problem as 'sexual and reproductive rights'. After negotiations and compromises, the terms 'reproductive health' and/or 'reproductive health for all' became most common.
the persuasiveness of their case, but by the effectiveness of their political gamesmanship. 6 This paper describes and analyses the processes behind this important example of global public policy making. Subsequently, it presents a short assessment of the impacts of the exclusion of reproductive health from the MDGs by drawing upon the findings of the Millennium Project. 7 There is a strong case that those who worked so effectively to block the reproductive health goal have obstructed human development and potentially slowed the pace of global poverty reduction. In particular, the number of women dying as a result of 'unsafe abortion' almost certainly increased. By concentrating on using political devices, rather than the power of their ethical and empirical arguments, the coalition of opponents of reproductive health implicitly fell back on the grounds that 'the end justifies the means'. In the short term this was an effective strategy -it achieved their objective over the period 2000-2005. In the longer term, however, this seems an untenable position for faiths and faith-based groups, as (i) a dependence on temporary and opportunistic political alliances ultimately weakens their claims to an ethical position, and (ii) it calls into question the historically privileged but ambiguous status of the Holy See at the United Nations.
The Millennium Development Goals
The Millennium Development Goals are a nested set of eight goals, 21 targets (i.e. subgoals) and 60 indicators. 8 They were first presented at the UN General Assembly in
September 2001 in Kofi Annan's Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United
6 Gamesmanship seems appropriate, as most of these opponents were males. 7 UN Millennium Project (2005) . Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (London: Earthscan). 8 The original list in 2001 was of 18 targets and 48 indicators, but this has been amended.
Box 1: Defining reproductive health
Reproductive health is the complete physical, mental and social wellbeing in all matters related to the reproductive system. This implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capacity to have children and the freedom to decide if and when to do so. Reproductive health care is defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and services that contribute to reproductive health and wellbeing by preventing and solving reproductive health problems. 
From sexual and reproductive rights to reproductive health
Until the 1980s, international development agencies and the governments of developing countries conceptualised reproductive issues through the lens of population and demography. The main challenge was framed as understanding the links between population growth and economic development. The prevailing orthodoxy was that high rates of population growth hampered economic growth and threatened the global environment. As a result, population control was prescribed: low fertility rates were to be pursued, so family planning must be promoted and services delivered. The overarching aim was to reduce aggregate fertility rates rather than achieve responsible individual choices about fertility. In its most extreme forms, in India and China, this approach has forced people to use contraceptives, be sterilised and have involuntary abortions.
In the industrialised world a quite different concept was shaping public attitudes and policy. The idea gained traction in developing countries in the late 1980s, however, as some of the social activists and women's NGOs activated by the UN Decade for Women (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) decided to prioritise reproductive rights and women's health in their programme design, research and advocacy. This prototype reproductive health movement rapidly honed its arguments, created a strong evidence base for policy lobbying and transferred technical advice and organisational skills across countries. Partly as a result of this social activism, the WHO adopted the concept of sexual and reproductive health at the end of the decade, creating a platform to take the idea forward as global public policy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, two important elements of advocacy for sexual and reproductive health appear to have evolved in ways that would advance the case more rapidly. This re-framing of the problem may have been adopted for tactical reasons, but it had strategic significance in terms of policy emphases.
Framing the issue
The first set of changes relates to the way in which proposals were framed. Over time campaigners used the term 'sexual and reproductive rights' less and less, and the terms 'reproductive health' and/or 'reproductive health services' became the brands under which these goals and policies were to be advanced. While the concept of sexual and reproductive rights has intellectual coherence and was heavily drawn on in the 1980s, the resonance of this term varied greatly with context and audience. In much of the economically advanced world -Europe, North America and Japan -the term 'sexual' could be used in public without creating offence. Following the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s the terms 'sex' and 'sexual' were in relatively common use in the mass media in these regions. The situation was quite different in many parts of the developing world, where it was, and often still is, highly offensive to use such terms in public, and where the mention of 'sex' may be interpreted as encouraging promiscuity, pre-marital and extra-marital sex or homosexuality.
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While the terms 'sexual and reproductive rights and/or health' remained in use, there is a marked preference over time to publicly frame approaches and policies as 'reproductive rights' or 'reproductive health'. This yielded at least two tactical benefits. First, in conservative societies, the new ideas were less likely to meet resistance because of concerns about the discussion of sexual issues in the public sphere. Men who would not let their wives or daughters discuss sexual matters with a health worker might let them discuss reproductive health. 16 Second, dropping the term 'sexual' appeared to remove debates about homosexuality from the agenda. 17 While from a rights-based perspective the sexual orientations of women and men are unjustifiable grounds for discrimination, entering into such debates in many developing countries would have been a tactical disaster for women's health and wellbeing. If opponents to the new agenda could claim it encouraged homosexuality, they would have mobilised widespread public support in many countries. As one advocate of a sexual and reproductive rights approach observes, '…developing "universal" ideas of sexuality is an exceedingly complex task'. 18 Arguably it is a task that, had it been pursued, would have set back progress on reproductive health for decades. Another factor explaining the gradual shift from 'rights' to 'health' relates to the changing agora (locations and actors) of global policy making on this issue. In the early 1980s the main bases for discussion were amongst feminists and sexual and reproductive rights advocacy groups within civil societies. At such locations, and for such actors, rightsbased arguments had legitimacy and authority. The early successes of these activists meant that over time more and more of the discussions and documentation moved to national arenas and agencies (health ministries, civil servants, training institutions and parliaments/national assemblies) and international arenas (UNFPA, World Bank, UN General Assembly and DAC). The pressures operating on such actors, and their behaviours, are quite different from those acting on social movements. Official actors are 16 The alliance between the Holy See and conservative Muslim counties at the ICPD was broken when proponents of reproductive health agreed to drop the term 'sexual rights' from the draft document (see later). 17 I say 'appeared', as in recent years the rights of gay couples to have children has become a moral and policy issue in some countries. 18 Correa, 'Sexual and reproductive rights', p. 370. 19 In the 1990s this was a major issue in Southeast and Eastern Asia. National leaders championed 'Asian values' and argued that human rights were an attempt to foist European values on Asian societies. In many Sub-Saharan African countries there are strong prejudices against homosexuality, which is often seen as part of Western culture and not African culture.
often more focused on the short-term and resource allocation issues and have quite different forms of accountability. As advocacy for 'sexual and reproductive rights' shifted from groups of like-minded supporters to more diverse, and often suspicious, national and international agencies, it mutated into 'reproductive health'. Persuading governments and multilateral organisations to promote sexual and reproductive rights might be desirable, but was problematic. Persuading them to commit to providing reproductive health for all was desirable and more likely to gain their support. At UN meetings and conferences this shift facilitated the negotiation of progressive compromises. One could demand 'sexual and reproductive rights' in opening statements, and subsequently show a willingness to compromise in final documents and declarations by agreeing to 'reproductive health services for all'.
Making the case
The second set of changes relates to the forms and composition of argument used to support the case for reproductive health and/or sexual and reproductive rights. By the early 1990s there were three related but distinct arguments. The first was normative. The second and third required empirical support: this had been gathered over the 1980s and extending this knowledge base remained an important task over the 1990s.
(i) Rights -Drawing from moral philosophy and building on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, a powerful argument was developed that sexual and reproductive rights were core human rights. Allied to this was the argument that women's rights must be respected in the same ways as those of men.
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(ii) Direct benefits -An expanding evidence base was created and deployed to demonstrate that improved access to reproductive health services produced beneficial health outcomes -reduced maternal and child mortality, fewer spontaneous and unsafe abortions, improved child health and welfare. The launch of the journal Reproductive Health Matters in 1993 provided an important mechanism for rapidly sharing results about policies, methods and outcomes and creating a coherent epistemic community.
Indirect benefits -Following the shifts in feminist thinking from women in development (WID) to gender and development (GAD) and women and development (WAD), 21 evidence was gathered to demonstrate that improved access to reproductive health services contributed to broader development goals and, particularly, economic growth. Findings were collated to show that this approach led to higher productivity, reduced fertility and dependency rates and a higher quality workforce.
With increasing sophistication, and building on the earlier experience of the women's movement, advocates for reproductive health tapered the composition of their arguments for different audiences. In Europe (particularly Northern Europe) and UN conferences, human rights and women's rights arguments would draw support; for meetings of medical and health professionals and policy makers the direct benefits of a reproductive health strategy over orthodox family planning had to be demonstrated; for economists, demographers and development policy makers (at the World Bank, IMF and ministries of finance) the third set of arguments had to be emphasised to justify the allocation of additional resources.
The MDGs and reproductive health The UN Conferences and Summits of the 1990s
The Millennium Development Goals have many origins, but most analysts trace them back to the resurgence of UN conferences and summits that started with the Children's Summit of 1990. 22 The international women's movement homed in on these meetings as an important mechanism for advancing gender equality. The movement now had effective structures to influence such events: a global network of NGOs and advocacy groups, who could operate at the national level in both developed and developing countries; and highly skilled lobbying groups in New York, Washington DC and other global centres. While proponents for sexual and reproductive rights, women's health and reproductive health were drawn from outside of the women's movement, particularly from health and medicine, the push for a paradigm change in population policy was spearheaded by the women's movement.
The movement was very effective at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio in 1992 and managed to establish that '…women's issues are part of global agendas and must be incorporated there, rather than addressed separately'. 23 There were heated debates at Rio about the relative importance of population in poor countries vis-à-vis reduced consumption in rich countries. As a consequence '…a group of women decided to initiate an international campaign to build a consistent framework on population issues among women's groups and to bring women's voices to the upcoming conference on population and development'. Cairo. Out of this spin-off from the Rio conference emerged the Women's Voices '94 Alliance (WV94A). This alliance produced the 'Women's Declaration on Population Policy' to help activists find a common platform and it had significant influence at Cairo.
In addition to the WV94A initiative, the 'women's caucus' model was developed at Rio. This device was used at subsequent UN conferences. It involved the convening of a meeting early each morning at the NGO forum (the civil society event that runs parallel to the official conference) to review the previous day's results, share information and plan the strategy for the day in hand. It was a simple device, but it helped to focus activists on achieving specific changes in documents, agreeing priorities and allocating tasks (such as who would take the lead on lobbying specific delegates and delegations).
The momentum from Rio was taken forward to the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993. The women's movement operated very effectively in the official preparatory meetings (PrepComs) and in Vienna achieved agreement that women's rights were integral to human rights. The women's caucus device was used and extended. In addition to the NGO Women's Caucus, a daily Governmental Women's Caucus was convened for official delegates by UNIFEM.
However, it was at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994 that '…a giant leap for womankind was achieved'. 25 From its inception the Cairo Conference had great promise as the UN's General Assembly had broadened the Conference's agenda from 'population', the 1974 and 1984 title, to 'population and development' signalling that debates must move beyond population control. By chance the Cairo conference was fortunate in its location and timing. It being based in a Middle Eastern country with a Muslim majority encouraged conservative Islamic countries, which were concerned about a population and development agenda, to participate. Having delegates from all UN member states gave the meeting global legitimacy. In terms of timing, it occurred when the international women's movement had worked out how to maximise its impact at conferences, before the 'conference fatigue' of late-1995 had set in, and during the early months in office of a pro-choice US President. And finally the ICPD was chaired by Dr Nafis Sadik, the executive director of UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and a medical doctor whose professional life had been dedicated to advancing family planning. She was a highly effective norm entrepreneur, 26 who had a command of all the relevant technical arguments but could also function exceptionally well at diplomatic levels.
The Declaration from the WV94A stimulated at least 15 major meetings over 1993 and an unofficial 'feminist PrepCom' for the ICPD was organised in January 1994. This endorsed a collective statement and mandated the IWHC to lead a group targeting the drafting of the official conference documents. Massive efforts were mobilised on the ICPD preparatory processes to get pro-reproductive health candidates on official delegations, to influence the official PrepCom meetings, and to use the media to transmit the case for reproductive health.
As the conference opened at Cairo, the IWHC and WV94A were in a strong position and had the support of over 30,000 women's rights activists. 27 Following the Rio model, a
Women's Caucus was organised each morning at the NGO forum. In the afternoon, representatives of the Caucus and NGO members of official delegations 28 and the media met at the official conference site. A small, core group of reproductive health lobbyists systematically met official delegations to press them to support specific changes to the draft Programme of Action and fight the 'battle of the brackets' (see later). The DAC, comprised mainly of middle-aged men from rich countries, had no difficulties in agreeing this goal. 44 In most OECD countries reproductive health was not a controversial issue and in the one advanced country where it was an issue -the USthe Clinton administration had committed to the Cairo Agenda. With no Muslim countries in the OECD and with strong women's movements operating in most member countries, including reproductive health on the list was an easy decision for OECD members.
The IDGs themselves had relatively little impact on policies or action in the short term. While some countries, such as the UK, promoted them with great energy, for others they were just another international document to be filed away. For proponents of reproductive health, it was pleasing to see the goal on this list -but no big deal. Their energy was increasingly focused at the national level in getting the ICPD Programme of Action implemented.
The UN General Assembly, the ICPD+5 and the Millennium Summit
The next major date in the diaries of those promoting reproductive health came in 1999, with the five year follow-up meeting to Cairo (ICPD+5) at a special session of the UN General Assembly. Member nations reiterated their support for the Cairo Agenda following the efforts of '…countless nongovernmental organizations and committed government delegations', according to Stan Bernstein of UNFPA. 45 However, the language of parts of the declaration reveals a watering down of some elements of the reproductive health agenda and the 'unholy alliance' was more active and effective.
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Shortly after this meeting things began to go wrong for the international lobby for reproductive health. In part this may be because after the ICPD+5 meeting activists became complacent and believed that the paradigm shift from population control to reproductive health had been institutionalised. It may also have been that 'The Millennium Summit process did not loom large enough on people's radar screens'. 47 This was not the case for those opposed to the Cairo Agenda. The Millennium Summit was at the centre of their radar screens and they were working actively to ensure that 42 The DAC was keen on goals and targets, as many of its members were pursuing results-based management (see Hulme, 'The making of the Millennium Development Goals'). 43 DAC, Shaping the 21st Century, p.2. In addition, the IDGs included reducing infant and child mortality by two-thirds and reducing maternal mortality by three-fourths by 2015. 44 They did have difficulty in agreeing on a gender equality goal, however (see Hulme, 'Global poverty reduction'). 45 reproductive health was not mentioned in the Millennium Declaration that would be agreed at the Summit.
What has been labelled an 'unholy alliance' 48 was mobilizing, and would prove highly effective. According to Gita Sen this was spearheaded by the Holy See and included the UN delegations of conservative Islamic countries and conservative, evangelical Christian groups from the US. 49 The latter were growing in size, becoming increasingly effective in political terms and had developed a strong case challenging reproductive health. They claimed that it encouraged abortion on demand and sexual promiscuity. As an alternative they proposed sexual abstinence.
Gita Sen argues that since its involvement in the Rio Summit in 1992:
…the Holy See…project[ed] itself as a 'moral' authority for the world, espousing poverty and debt reduction…on the one hand, and opposing gender equity and sexual and reproductive health and rights on the other… the Holy See, though only an observer state at the UN, has played a key role in developing both strategy and tactics for the opposition to gender equality and women's human rights. By creating alliances with conservative governments across traditional religious divides, and by bringing its skills to bear on coalescing a non-governmental opposition as well, the Holy See played a critical role throughout the first decade after the ICPD.
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The influence of the Holy See was amplified through its interactions with a small number of conservative Islamic countries in the G77 (the UN's informal association of developing countries, which then numbered around 130 members promoting reproductive health, meant that even this goal was also excluded from We the Peoples.
Several other factors contributed to this blocking out of the reproductive health goal from the Millennium Summit agenda. First, political changes in the US meant that by 2000 the US delegation at the UN was not prepared to push the case for reproductive health. Al Gore was now running for President and faced a strong right-wing, anti-abortion lobby from Republicans. 'Many in this lobby sought to boil down reproductive rights to the single issue of abortion and they see this lurking behind every reference to such rights or choices'. 53 Gore could not risk being accused of promoting abortion in a UN resolution.
Second, observers 54 report that the case against reproductive health was strengthened by the powerful advocacy of Sudan's representative on this issue -an eloquent woman, who powerfully and persistently argued the conservative line of culture, tradition and the need to discourage young people from having sex outside marriage. Third, changes in the leadership of the UNFPA during this period meant that this key agency lost the momentum it had gained in the mid-1990s. The person in charge of discussions on targets and indicators at UNFPA at this time came from an orthodox family-planning background and had not been actively involved in the ICPD paradigm shift. 55 Finally, as observers of multilateral processes point out, the key people negotiating about what went into We the Peoples about population and development (as on all other specialist issues) were not people with professional backgrounds in this field (as had been the case at Cairo). They were diplomats, who prioritised geo-political and strategic considerations over the role of reproductive health in poverty reduction. In particular, the UN Secretary-General's senior advisor who was drafting We the Peoples, John Ruggie, was a 'message entrepreneur'. His priority was to achieve a progressive package of goals in the final Millennium Declaration that would be acceptable to all member countries. Losing the reproductive health goals was no big deal from this perspective.
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European countries and the World Bank argued strongly that reproductive health was an essential component of a strategy for poverty reduction and that other Declaration goals could not be achieved if reproductive health was omitted. But the Secretary-General and Secretariat were not going to risk producing a document that the G77, the majority of UN members, would not approve. To the chagrin of reproductive health proponents around the world -and most poverty reduction specialists -the April This might have appeared to have been the death knell for reproductive health in terms of the UN's Millennium Declaration. However, unobserved by most development experts, the target setting mania of the 1990s had left the world with a twin-track process. While the UN Secretariat was negotiating its way to an approved set of UN development goals, the OECD was sticking to its original set of International Development Goals (IDGs). The two organisations had started with the same inputs -the agreements from the UN summits and conferences of the 1990s -but their quite different political processes had yielded two different lists. These lists had a number of similarities, but also differed in a number of ways -especially on reproductive health. Confusingly, Kofi Annan was backing both of these lists. Only eight weeks after publishing We the Peoples, he signed and launched 2000 A Better World for All: Progress Towards the International Development Goals, a joint UN, OECD, IMF and World Bank document. This promised that the UN would support the IDGs -the sixth of which was an unequivocal goal to provide reproductive health for all by 2015. The Secretary-General was backing both tracks of the twin-track approach to goal setting that was underway. As head of the UN, he would lead the process for the Millennium Declaration's goals, but he was happy to sign up to the somewhat different goals that the OECD had generated.
Over summer 2000 there were frantic negotiations about what should finally go into the Millennium Declaration. To deal with these last-minute compromises, the UN civil servants involved appear to have used a classic diplomatic device. They divided the 'development and poverty eradication' goals resolutions into two main paragraphs.
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Paragraph 19 -'We resolve further' -includes those goals that are fully agreed and that are to go forward to the plan of action. Paragraph 20 -'We also resolve' -lists goals on which there is widespread agreement but where some UN members still have reservations. In effect, these goals stay on the agenda but there is no guarantee they will be part of a plan of action.
For reproductive health there are two main points to note when contrasting the IDGs (in 2000 A Better World for All), We the Peoples and the Millennium Declaration.
(i) Reproductive health does not appear in the Declaration. The 'unholy alliance's' grip on the G77, and the growing opposition to the idea from conservative Christians in the US, meant that the powerful backing that lay behind this goal (most OECD countries, the majority of developing countries, the International Financial Institutions, specialised UN agencies and vast civil society networks) had to back down. Reproductive health was the deal maker or breaker -to achieve approval of the Millennium Declaration at the General Assembly, reproductive health had to be omitted.
On a more positive note, the Declaration included the goals of '…reduced maternal mortality by three-quarters, and under-five child mortality by two- 57 In addition, the goals for rich countries were identified in Paragraphs 15 and 16.
thirds, of their current rates'. These were 'copied' from the IDGs and indicated that maternal and child health, if not reproductive health, would be a policy priority.
On 8 September 2000 the Millennium Declaration was approved, with the support of 189 countries and 147 heads of state and government. The General Assembly tasked Kofi Annan with preparing a 'road map' for the implementation of the Declaration's poverty eradication goals.
Concordance: Merging the IDGs and the Millennium Declaration
Before Annan could develop this implementation plan, he needed final agreement from all of the key official players in international development on what the exact goals and targets would be. The Declaration provided a variety of resolutions, scattered around four different paragraphs, but not a precise statement in the results-based management format now favoured by aid donors and multilateral agencies.
The UN's statisticians were already liaising with co-professionals at the DAC in Paris about indicators and sources of data. As the UN agencies had to follow the Declaration, and as the OECD saw no reason to drop the IDGs (and had UN, World Bank and IMF agreement on them), there were two possible ways that the twin-track process might run:
1. Continue with a twin-track process. This would mean that the UN and OECD both got their own way, but would make the job of programming global poverty reduction (plans, structures, financing, monitoring) complex for implementing agencies and confusing for politicians and publics. 2. Reconcile the two sets of goals. This was the logical thing to do, but was problematic. How could Annan explain to the General Assembly that he had modified an agreement that 189 countries had approved? On the other hand, why should the OECD change the IDGs -in June 2000 the UN, World Bank and IMF had endorsed them?
This issue was brought to a head in March 2001, at a World Bank convened meeting attended by more than 200 delegates from the multilaterals, bilateral donors and more than a dozen developing countries. 58 It opened with a proposal from Mark Malloch Brown, Head of UNDP, that the UN should be given the task of finalising the 'Millennium Declaration Goals' from the Millennium Declaration. Several delegates pointed out that this would mean that key components of the IDGs would be lost (most obviously reproductive health) but Malloch Brown dismissed this:
…my view is that the International Development Goals were a step towards a process which has now culminated with a unique act of endorsement… at the Millennium Summit… my view is that it is a step back to a less universally, less high-level endorsed set of goals.
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A US delegate, Colin Bradford, argued that 'concordance' could be achieved and, after much private negotiation, it was agreed that a technical task force be set up to merge the two sets of goals -with members from the DAC (representing OECD), World Bank, IMF and UNDP. points from the Millennium Declaration were subsequently negotiated into the MDGs, but as lower level targets or indicators. Only two major changes were made to the IDGs as they transmuted into the MDGs. First, a Goal 8 was added -laying out the sorts of policy and process changes needed in rich countries to facilitate global poverty reduction. Second, the IDG goal of reproductive health for all disappeared.
While reproductive health was an explicit goal in the IDGs, and a central component of a human development conceptualisation of poverty reduction (as both a means and an end), the UN could not entertain this because of the continued reservations of a small number of its members (see earlier). The US position had also changed. Although the new US president showed little interest in the UN or global poverty reduction, the members of the task force drafting the MDGs fully understood that the Bush administration was committed to an aggressive anti-abortion stance. 63 One of George W. Bush's first acts as President was to re-introduce President Reagan's Mexico City/global gag rule. This required all recipients of US foreign aid to ensure that no element of their programmes was associated in any way with performing, or advising on, abortions. As a result, US funding for many family planning programmes was immediately stopped.
reproductive rights principles underlying the reproductive health goal. 64 Exactly how the decision to axe reproductive health was taken has not been documented, but during interviews in New York several UN insiders (all of whom wish to remain anonymous) used the same expression -'it was crossed out on the 38th floor' (referring to where the Secretary General's office is located). There was a consolation prize for reproductive health advocates in the final agreement, however, as 'improved maternal health' became a full MDG goal, separate from child health.
Implementing the MDGs
With the goals finally agreed, the agenda shifted to implementation. This meant preparing a plan and finding the finance to implement the MDGs. The finance issue was to be thrashed out in Monterrey, Mexico at the UN Finance for Development (FFD) meeting in March 2002. Prospects for the FFD were not good, as global 'Millennium fever' had waned and the US seemed suspicious of the MDGs. Neither President Bush nor any of his advisors had been part of the IDG or MDG process, and their neoconservative stance made global poverty reduction a marginal issue. They had little time for the UN and thought that the FFD might be an attempt to get the US to foot the bill for other countries' promises. The Bush administration was not embarrassed to state that all of its decisions would be based purely on the US national interest, and it made this point forcefully by refusing to collaborate in international processes to curb climate changeindeed by saying climate change was not happening.
However, the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers modified this unilateral stance for a time. It led to the reconsideration of the role of 'soft power' and, to the surprise of many observers (both supporters and opponents), Bush turned up at Monterrey and promised a large increase in US foreign aid. 65 The European nations also agreed to significant aid increases and the 'Monterrey Consensus' was forged. There were two main ways that these additional resources might be channelled to MDG achievement. 65 See Hulme, 'Global poverty reduction', for a discussion. Bush's decision was taken very rapidly after a meeting with Bono. 66 Sachs is probably the most publicly recognised economist in the world, although he lacks a Nobel laureate. He is also a controversial figure and is both renowned and reviled. While his Millennium Project. Sachs assembled more than 250 development experts into ten task forces and they set about drafting plans for MDG achievement. The Project, like its leader, was highly ambitious. It sought to identify the technologies and actions that could achieve rapid poverty reduction, identify the institutional requirements, estimate the finances required and contribute to the mobilisation of these resources. Such an exercise might appear to be irrelevant for reproductive health -it was not an MDG. However, the reports that Sachs and his specialist teams assembled argued that reproductive health was central to any plan to achieve the MDGs. The MDGs could not be achieved unless reproductive health was energetically promoted. UN) . 70 The efforts of the UK government, particularly Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and like-minded colleagues from other countries, failed. The US wanted to focus the summit on counter-terrorism. The run-up to the Summit was thrown into confusion when the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, tabled more than 700 amendments to the draft final agreement at the last moment. The event itself was then upstaged by Hurricane Katrina and the world's amazement at the Bush administration's failure to provide humanitarian support for its own citizens.
has been limited direct action on the grand project it specified, it did help to re-ignite debates about the role of reproductive health in strategies for global poverty eradication. 
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
More parents have larger families than they desire, and child spacing intervals are shortened. As a result family investment in each child's nutrition and health is lowered and poverty and hunger for all members of the family becomes more likely and/or more severe. In addition, at the national level, population growth rates are higher than they would be if services could be better accessed: this impacts negatively on national social and economic development. Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education. Reduced access to reproductive health services means that families are larger, and children closer together, than parents would have chosen. As a result investment in education per child is reduced. In most societies this impacts particularly on girls, who are regarded as having a lower priority. At the national level, education budgets have to be spread across a larger number of schoolchildren, reducing the quality of education. This has negative implications for educational attainment, as a goal in its own right, and for patterns and rates of economic growth. Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women. Controlling whether and when to have children is a critical aspect of women's empowerment that is greatly curtailed when reproductive health services are not easily accessible. Women who cannot plan the timing and number of their births have more limited opportunities at work, in education and in economic and social life.
Goal 4
Reduce child mortality. Lack of access to prenatal care and reduced ability to avoid high-risk births (especially for very young women and when births are close together) increases the probability of infant and child deaths. Children in large families are likely to have reduced health care, and national health expenditures per child decrease when fertility levels are high. Goal 5 Improve maternal health. Lower levels of access to reproductive health services lead to more unwanted births, more higher-risk pregnancies and reduced levels of care in pregnancy, childbirth and post-delivery. All of these raise maternal mortality rates. A particular problem in many societies is an increased rate of unsafe abortion (often provided outside of medical facilities) and associated mortalities. For the early 2000s these were estimated at more than 68,000 deaths per annum.
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Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Lack of access to reproductive health services raises rates of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV infection rates through reduced levels of knowledge and access to medical services. Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability. Constraints in the provision of reproductive health services lead to increased fertility rates and population growth. This makes it more likely that natural resource use will exceed sustainable levels and increases rates of urban migration and international migration.
As a result of the arguments outlined above, the blocking or obstruction of access to reproductive health services for five years by the 'unholy alliance' seems almost certain to have reduced progress towards the MDGs, and have increased poverty and human deprivation. While the exact reductions in MDG achievement cannot be estimated, the causal links between reduced access to reproductive health services and slower progress towards the MDG targets are clear.
From a conservative, religious perspective, such an analysis may appear irrelevantany action that might make abortion more accessible and/or promotes contraceptive use and/or recognises the legitimacy of homosexuality and/or might facilitate/encourage premarital or extra-marital sexual activity is morally wrong and must be opposed, regardless of the outcomes. However if, as I do, you believe it is immoral for progress in reducing poverty to be slowed down -reducing extreme income poverty, lowering the number of hungry people, moving towards gender equality, letting child and maternal mortality rates remain high, slowing down progress in preventing HIV/AIDS incidence rates and raising the probability of environmental sustainability -then the consequences of the political manoeuvring of the Holy See and its temporary allies to block reproductive rights for all, and impose its moral stance on an unconvinced world, merit condemnation.
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Conclusion
This paper has charted the evolution of reproductive health as a component of the Millennium Development Goals. It explains the rise of reproductive health as a new paradigm for the framing of population and family planning issues. This rise was dependent on energetic support from the women's movement, the establishment of specialist NGOs and networks, and the development of an epistemic community (comprised of medical and health specialists, demographers and social scientists) determined to research and document the benefits of a reproductive health approach and identify 'best' practices.
However, the rise of reproductive health for all as a global goal was challenged by a small part of the UN's membership, in alliance with the Holy See (a non-member state observer at the UN). This opposition believed that a reproductive health approach was, and is, morally wrong as it promotes 'abortion on demand' (the main concern of the Holy See and other Christian conservatives), homosexuality, pre-marital and extra-marital sexual relations, and greater control for women over sexual and reproductive behaviours (concerns for conservative Muslim groups and some conservative Christians). This small group, in global terms, successfully blocked the listing of reproductive health as an MDG goal in 2000 and 2001. Belatedly in 2005 -through advocacy from the women's movement, highly effective work by the reproductive health epistemic community within the Millennium Project and the UN, and the break-up of the alliance between the Holy See and conservative Islamic UN member states -reproductive health has returned to the MDGs. But now it is a target (i.e. lower level objective) and its formal entry was stalled for a further two years by debates about the precise specification of indicators.
Moving beyond the moral debates around reproductive health, the paper presented an assessment of the consequences accruing from blocking reproductive health as an MDG. While precise estimates cannot be made, the case that the direct costs of this action (in terms of increased numbers of unwanted pregnancies and increased rates of child and maternal mortality) and the indirect costs (increased income poverty and hunger, slower progress with universal primary education and gender empowerment) have been negative seems unassailable. Those who obstructed access to reproductive health services in the developing world have imposed a burden on the poor and especially on poor women.
The capacity of a small component of humanity (the Holy See, three or four conservative Islamic states and, belatedly, conservative Christians in the US) to obstruct access to reproductive health services for hundreds of millions of people (mainly poor women) was not a moral victory, in which the strength of the ethical reasoning won the day. Rather, it was a triumph of political manoeuvring. The opponents of reproductive health did not waste too much of their time publicly debating and detailing their moral case and exploring its empirical consequences. Rather, they focused on covert political negotiations and bargaining. They achieved their immediate objective -blocking reproductive health as an MDG goal -for more than five years, but the 'unholy alliance' that was forged has fallen apart and their moral stature has been weakened. Reproductive health will remain a contentious issue in some parts of the world, but the power of its theoretical and empirical case (contrasted with the guile and political horsetrading tactics of its opponents) should ensure its advance over the medium and longer term.
